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Optimizely hack: how 178 sites served malware

The Optimizely hack put a card skimmer, crypto stealer and iPhone exploits on 178 big sites in one day. How it got in and how to check if you were hit.

opnF.shNov 17, 20267 min readoptimizelysupply chain attackweb skimming
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TL;DR

  • Optimizely has closed the hole, but the sites that loaded its script must now treat card details typed on their pages on November 16, and any cookies it could read, as exposed.
  • Nobody can count the card numbers taken, and no iPhone has been confirmed hacked, so the full damage is still unknown.
New to this?Ping explains the hardest part in plain words.

On November 16, CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Fox News and HSBC were among 178 organizations whose websites ran malware for their visitors, and none of them had to be broken into for it to happen. The Optimizely hack came through a script every one of them had chosen to load, and for all that reach, it paid the attacker roughly $7,000 in crypto.

Quick facts

Optimizely's own homepage and login page served the malware too.

Sites that trusted cdn.optimizely.com in their security policy got no protection from that rule, because the malware arrived from that exact address.

It wasn't the attacker's first run: the same loader rode in through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts from November 13.

#What happened in the Optimizely hack

Optimizely Web is an A/B testing tool: a site adds one script tag from Optimizely's servers, and its marketing team changes pages and runs experiments from Optimizely's console. Each customer project also has a Project JavaScript box for the customer's own code. The attacker wrote a small loader into that box across projects belonging to unrelated companies, and Optimizely's network delivered it the same way it delivers everything else. Even sites that host their own copy of the snippet were hit, because those copies are built from the same project data.

Here's how the day played out. All times are UTC on November 16 (Pacific is 8 hours behind) unless marked:

  • The BBC's Optimizely snippet starts loading the attacker's injector, the first infection seen
  • The crypto-swapping payload, track.js, appears on bbc.com
  • The attacker moves the crypto collected so far to exchange deposit addresses
  • A card skimmer is added to the payload
  • A second iPhone router joins, and visitors on iOS 18.6 or earlier start getting an exploit frame
  • Report URI starts a sweep of 1,611 Optimizely snippets and finds the code in 186 of them (188 in the final count)
  • Mass cleanup starts; TalkTalk's snippet is the last one still infected at 21:52
  • Every infected Optimizely file is clean
  • Optimizely posts its incident notice at 01:02 UTC

Optimizely says the attacker exploited a flaw in the sign-up process for its experimentation product, and that it has "fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code from affected projects" and secured affected accounts. What it hasn't said is how a sign-up flaw gave one attacker write access to projects at so many different companies, and Report URI's Scott Helme asks the same question.

#What the malware did to visitors

By the end of the day, every visitor got the same script, doing four jobs:

  • Card skimmerAdded partway through the day, it grabbed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs typed into forms on a site's own pages. Payment boxes hosted by providers like Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach.
  • Crypto address swapperIt replaced wallet addresses with the attacker's own in page text, copied text and outgoing requests, and only swapped addresses that pass their chain's checksum, so wallets wouldn't flag the fake.
  • iPhone exploit kitsOn iPhones and iPads it loaded known exploit kits in a hidden frame, picked by iOS version: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18. Delivery is confirmed; a hacked phone isn't.
  • Cookies and screenshotsWhen it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the attacker the page address, any cookies not marked HttpOnly and a screenshot.
ELI5: explain it simply
Ping explainsNo experience needed.
THE WORDS
HttpOnly cookie
A cookie the browser hides from page scripts, so code like this can't read it.
Exploit kit
A ready-made bundle of attacks that tries the right one for the device that loads it.
Hidden frame
A second web page loaded inside the first one, made invisible to the visitor.
THE IDEA

Picture a shop that lets a trusted supplier restock its shelves overnight. One night someone gets in through the supplier's back door, swaps the bank details on the payment sign, copies cards at the till and hands iPhone owners a booby-trapped leaflet. The shop's own locks were never touched.

The exact figure depends on who's counting. Report URI saw about $7,040 reach the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC, while The Hacker News reports that StepSecurity counted about $6,600 across the same wallets and points out that two of them were in use before the attack, so the chain alone can't show which transfers came from victims.

#How to check if you were affected by the Optimizely hack

Start with the site list. Report URI published the domains of all 178 organizations, grouped by sector, in its write-up, so check whether a site you used on November 16 is on it. Your risk then depends on what you did there.

If you visited an affected site

Work through these in order of what each could cost you:

  1. Check any crypto you sentIf you paid or sent crypto from an affected page on November 16, compare the address it went to with the one you meant to use, ideally on your hardware wallet's screen. A swapped address passes the checksum, so nothing would have warned you.
  2. Watch your card statementThis only applies if you typed a card into a form on the site's own page after 13:43 UTC (5:43 a.m. Pacific). Report any charge you don't recognize to your bank.
  3. Update your iPhone or iPadiOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, are patched against these kits (Settings > General > Software Update). One sign the kit targeted you on an older version: an affected page that kept reloading itself about once a minute while it retried.

If you can't remember which sites you used that day, the safe default covers most of the risk: update iOS now and keep an eye on your card statements for the next few weeks.

If your site uses Optimizely

Optimizely says it has contacted affected customers, but don't wait for the email. The researchers' advice for site owners comes down to three jobs:

  1. Rotate accessStart by cutting off any access the attacker may still have: review your Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations, and rotate them.
  2. Look for code you didn't writeCheck your Project JavaScript and experiment code for unfamiliar scripts and atob() calls (one loader variant hid its address in Base64), and ask Optimizely whether your project IDs were changed, and when.
  3. Treat that day's data as exposedCard details typed into your own forms on November 16, and secrets in cookies without HttpOnly, should be treated as stolen. Talk to your payments and legal teams about notifying customers.

#Why most security policies didn't stop it

A Content Security Policy (CSP) is a header that tells the browser which servers a page may load scripts from (script-src) and send data to (connect-src). It's what protected the sites that escaped. Report URI checked the affected sites' policies: 68 had none at all, and of the sites it could classify, only about 15% (24 organizations) had one strict enough to block the payload. Another 17 stopped the stolen data from leaving, but the address swapping still ran.

The policies failed for reasons worth knowing before you write your own:

  • Allowing cdn.optimizely.comEvery site using Optimizely has to allow it, and the loader came from there. The policy only helped when it refused the next step: track.js, loaded from the attacker's own domain.
  • 'unsafe-eval'One loader variant ran through eval(), which this setting permits. SOCRadar notes that Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow it.
  • 'strict-dynamic'This setting trusts any script that an already-trusted script loads, so once the Optimizely snippet was trusted, whatever it pulled in was too.

To see what your own site sends, run curl -sI https://your-site.com | grep -i content-security-policy. No output means no policy. If you add one, start in report-only mode so a too-strict rule logs problems instead of breaking your pages.

#Not just an Optimizely problem

Optimizely was this attacker's second wave. From November 13, the same loader showed up in scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, and SOCRadar traces it back to September 17, when it first appeared on Turkish websites through an SEO backlink panel's script. Each of those vendors is one more company that can change what runs on its customers' pages, and the customers' visitors see it all as the site's own code.

Tracing an attack like this one, from a single odd script to its loader, wallets and earlier waves, is security operations and incident response work. The Security Pro ProCourse has levels on both, in a simulated terminal in your browser, and Level 1 is free.

Was CNN hacked?
Not in the usual sense. CNN, like Fox News and the BBC, loads Optimizely's script, and the attacker changed what that script delivered, so CNN's visitors ran the malware on November 16.
Is it safe to visit these sites now?
Report URI saw every infected Optimizely file clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16, and Optimizely says the vulnerable path is blocked and it has added protections against unauthorized code delivery. Updating iOS is still worth doing: Google researchers had documented both exploit kits before this attack, so they aren't tied to Optimizely.
What is OPTIMJACK?
It's the name some researchers gave this campaign. Optimizely calls it a security incident affecting some Web Experimentation customers; both refer to the same November 16 attack.

What this means for you

If you visited one of the listed sites on November 16, update iOS and check that day's crypto and card payments. If you run a website, list every third-party script that can change your pages, and test a CSP strict enough to block a script from a domain you never approved, because a trusted vendor was the way in this time.

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